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Abstract
We reconsider the multivariate Kyle model in a risk-neutral setting with a single, perfectly informed
rational insider and a rational competitive market maker, setting the price of n correlated securities. We
prove the unicity of a symmetric, positive definite solution for the impact matrix and provide insights on
its interpretation. We explore its implications from the perspective of empirical market microstructure, and
argue that it provides a sensible inference procedure to cure some pathologies encountered in recent attempts
to calibrate cross-impact matrices. As an illustration, we determine the empirical cross impact matrix of US
Treasuries, and compare the results with recent alternative calibration methods.
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1 Introduction
Understanding market impact – the mechanism through which trades tend to push prices – is with no doubt a
venture of paramount importance. From the theoretical point of view, market impact lies at the very heart of
price formation in financial markets. From the practitioners perspective, market impact is often at the origin of
non negligible trading costs that need to be controlled to optimise execution strategies. In the past decades most
of the literature has focused on the price impact of single products (for a recent review, see [BBDG18]), with
no regard of inter-asset interactions. However, many market participants trade large portfolios that combine
hundreds or thousands of assets. Thus addressing the matter of inter-asset price impact, coined cross-impact, is
one of great interest both fundamentally and practically. Recent empirical studies show evidence of significant
cross-impact effects in stock markets [HS01, PV13, WSG16, BMEB17]. A recurrent issue is that of empirical
noise when it comes to large matrix estimation. It is thus important to continue to search for good statistical
priors in order to help “clean” these large dimensional estimators.
What should one expect from theoretical economics on this matter? Which empirical observations should
be considered unusual? Here we focus on how to make sense of the empirical observations accumulated over
the past few years in the most orthodox setting: the classic Kyle model [Kyl85], extended to a multi-asset
framework. Our aim is to gain insight into (i) how information is diffused into prices (cross-sectionally) within
the Kyle setting and (ii) how one can use such results to regularise the very noisy regressions that arise in
empirical cross-impact analysis. The multivariate Kyle model was first considered in [CK94], in a very general
setting with n assets and m partially informed traders. The generality of the model is such that only a partial
analysis of the solution is possible; furthermore, it involves an object that cannot be measured directly on
empirical data, namely the correlation of the order flow of informed traders. Here we reconsider the problem
with the issue of empirical calibration in mind. We focus on the particular case m = 1 and provide a proof
that the linear equilibrium is unique and characterized by a symmetric, positive definite (SPD) impact matrix.
This solution provides an explicit recipe to infer cross impact from (cleaned) order flow and return correlation
matrices, that we compare to other natural recipes, such as Maximum Likelihood Estimators (MLE) [BMEB17]
or the recently proposed “EigenLiquidity” Model (ELM) [MBEB17].
The paper is organised as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we introduce the multivariate Kyle model and provide
the equilibrium strategies, mostly building upon the work in [CK94] but also providing new results. In section 4
we study in detail the mathematical properties of the solution. In section 5, we introduce an impact estimator
based on the equilibrium strategy of the market maker and compare it to other usual estimators both from
the theoretical and empirical point of view. Along the text we present several examples intended to provide
intuition behind the main results. In particular it is often interesting to confront the results of the multivariate
and univariate models.
2
In all the following bold uppercase symbols denote matrices, bold lower cases denote vectors and light lower
cases denote scalars.
2 The Multivariate Kyle Model
In this section, we present in detail the multivariate Kyle setting and define the observables that would allow
one to calibrate the model using empirical observables.
2.1 The Model
Consider a single-period economy where three representative agents trade n instruments. The agents are: an
informed trader (IT) who has perfect information about the future prices v, a noise trader (NT) that trades in
absence of any information due to exogenous reasons, and a competitive market maker (MM) that has the role
of enforcing price efficiency. The dynamics of the model is set by the following rules.
1. A fundamental price v is sampled from a Gaussian distribution v ∼ N (p0,Σ0) where Σ0 is SPD. Only
the IT knows the value of v in advance, while p0 and Σ0 are common knowledge. We denote the price
deviation from its mean as ∆v := v − p0.
2. The IT and NT place simultaneously their orders of sizes x an u respectively. The bids of the NT u are
sampled from a Gaussian distribution u ∼ N (0,Ω) independent of the fundamental price, where Ω is an
invertible matrix.
3. The MM clears the excess demand y at a clearing price p based on the total observed order imbalance
y = x+u, that allows him/her to form the best estimation of the fundamental prices. These fundamental
prices are then revealed.
The quantity x requested by the risk-neutral IT is such that he maximises the expectation of his utility function:
UIT (x,p) = x>(v − p) . (1)
Note that UIT does not contain any risk penalty. While the introduction of such a penalty would affect some of
the conclusions below, we decide to leave this interesting issue for future work. Consistent with the assumption
that market making is competitive, the MM sets a price that matches in expectation v given the available public
information, namely the total order imbalance y:
p = E[v|y] , (2)
where E[·] denotes average with respect to the distribution of v and u.
Clearly, the above setting is highly stylized and, on many counts, unrealistic.1 Still, this model is able to
capture some of the essential ingredients of a reasonable price-formation process: the information owned by
ITs gets encoded into a trading order imbalance x polluted by a noise u. In a competitive regime, MMs are
expected to decode the information contained in the total order imbalance y = x+ u, in order to provide the
best possible prediction of the fundamental price v. This mechanically induces market impact: because the
order imbalance y is correlated with the fundamental price, the traded price p will also display a correlation
with the order imbalance y, by that providing a sensible measure of market impact.
2.2 Observables
In order to gain insight on the implications of this model and in order to make testable predictions, one is
required to provide some metrics that can be compared against market data. Luckily enough, the Gaussian
nature of the setup allows one to only consider first- and second-order statistics (means and covariances) of
1For example, the order flow in a Kyle setting has no temporal auto-correlations, whereas it is well known that the empirical
order flow has long memory. See [BBDG18] and [BMEB17] for a recent discussion in the multivariate context.
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prices and volumes in order to completely characterize the behavior of the model. Naturally, the fundamental
parameters defining the model (Ω,Σ0) are not directly observable, and need to be inferred from the statistics
of trades prices p, and of volumes y, which are the only physical observables of the model.
Prices Due to the price efficiency condition (see Eq. (2)), the average traded price is equal to the average of
the fundamental price, itself equal (for consistency) to the initial price:
E[p] = E[v] = p0 . (3)
However, the covariance of the traded price and that of the fundamental price have no reason to coincide:
Σ = C[p,p] = E[(p− p0)(p− p0)>] , (4)
Σ0 = C[v,v] = E[(v − p0)(v − p0)>] . (5)
Further down we show that, at equilibrium, Σ and Σ0 are exactly proportional (see Eq. (24)).
Volumes Due to the non-informed nature of the NT, the average order imbalance is fixed by the bias intro-
duced by the IT, so that:
E[y] = E[x] := x0 . (6)
The relation between the portion of volume covariance due to the NT and the one due to the IT is more subtle,
and is given by:
Ωd = C[y,y] = C[x,x] + Ω , (7)
where we have introduced what we have coined the dressed volume covariance Ωd, which is the physically
observable quantity. Correspondingly, the bare volume covariance (i.e. not dressed by the noise contribution
Ω) is C[x, x].
Response Ultimately, we are interested in characterising the expected price changes conditionally to a given
trade imbalance: the response function, directly related to price impact. Within this model, the physical
observables measuring such quantities, that we coin dressed responses, are:
Rd = E[(p− p0)y>] = C[p,y] , (8)
Rdv = E[(v − p0)y>] = C[v,y] . (9)
Due to the absence of correlations between the non-informed order imbalance u and v, one can relate the
dressed responses with the responses with respect to x: R and Rv, that we coin bare responses, through
R = E[(p− p0)x>] = C[p,x] = Rd − C[p,u] , (10)
Rv = E[(v − p0)x>] = C[v,x] = Rdv . (11)
Interestingly, while the fundamental prices are insensitive to the level of noise trading, the traded prices
incorporate some degree of mispricing due to the spurious correlations between the total order imbalance y and
the fundamental prices v.
3 Equilibrium strategies
In this section we characterise the equilibrium strategies of the multivariate Kyle model. Although most of
the results can be inferred from the seminal work of Caballe´ and Krishnan [CK94], we believe it is useful to
provide a streamlined version of our own proofs, which we present in a more pedagogical and in some cases more
compact form and within which several theoretical issues and empirical implications can be discussed explicitly.
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3.1 Linear equilibrium
Our main result is the existence of a unique linear equilibrium as defined below, whose structure can be expressed
analytically.
Definition 1 (Linear equilibrium). By linear equilibrium, we mean a set of strategies in which the MM fixes
the traded prices p and the IT fixes their bid x by means of linear rules
p = µ+ Λy , (12)
x = α+Bv , (13)
such that the two following conditions are satisfied:
1. Profit maximization: for all alternative strategies with x′ 6= x,
E[UIT(x,p)|v] > E[UIT(x′,p)|v].
2. Price efficiency: The price p satisfies (2).
Based on the assumption of a linear strategy for the MM as given in Eq. (12), we obtain the following results
(proofs are provided in App. A).
Proposition 1. Imposing the linear pricing rule (12) for the MM implies that a rational IT will also set the
order imbalance x as a linear function of the imbalance, with:
x =
1
2
Λ−1S (v − µ) , (14)
where ΛS denotes the symmetric part of Λ. Furthermore, the profit maximization condition for the IT’s strategy
implies that ΛS has to be positive-definite (PD).
Eq. (12) shows that Λ plays the role of adjusting the traded price level p proportionally to the imbalance
y. Proposition 1 shows that Λ also plays the role of setting the order imbalance from the informed trader x
given the knowledge of the fundamental price v. Moreover, Eq. (14) together with Eq. (12) imply that both
the order imbalance y and the traded price p are normally distributed random variables, due to stability of the
Gaussian distribution under convolution. This last property is at the core of the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assuming a linear strategy for the IT as in Eq. (14) implies that the parameters of the pricing
rule of Eq. (12) for the MM are given by:
µ = p0 −Λy0 ,
Λ = Rdv(Ω
d)−1.
(15)
Note that y0, R
d
v and Ω
d depend on x, and therefore of ΛS. Substituting (15) into Eq. (14) allows to close
the system and find an equation for Λ. Note however that the as obtained system has many possible solutions.
To constrain the latter we must impose the profit maximization condition introduced in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3. Assume that there exists a solution to the utility maximization problem of the IT of the form
given by Eq. (14), and to the pricing rule for the MM given by Eqs. (12) and (15). Then, the profit maximization
condition that ΛS has to be PD implies that Λ is symmetric and satisfies the equation:
1
4
Σ0 = ΛΩΛ . (16)
The symmetry of Λ leads to a unique solution that can be expressed in terms of the parameters of the
problem (i.e. Σ0 and Ω). Denoting by
√
Y the unique (see Lemma 1 in App. A.3) PD solution of the matrix
equation XX = Y for a SPD Y we introduce the following theorem:
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Theorem 1 (Existence and unicity of the linear equilibrium). There exists a unique linear equilibrium given
by the strategies (12) and (14) where:
Λ = 12R−1
√RΣ0LL−1 , (17)
y0 = 0 , (18)
µ = p0 . (19)
Here L,R are a factorisation of the matrix Ω = LR satisfying L = R>.
Note that the existence result is a special case of Proposition 3.1 from Ref. [CK94], specialised to the case of
a single IT with perfect information. Nonetheless, the absence of other equilibria with non-symmetric Λ lacked
a published proof (although a similar discussion can be found in an unpublished paper by Caballe´ and Krishnan
[CK+90]). Because the symmetry property of Λ has crucial consequences on both price formation and pricing
(see discussion in Sections 4 and 5) we believe that ruling out the existence of non-symmetric equilibria is an
important step in the analysis of the multivariate Kyle model. This is the main novel theoretical contribution
of the present paper.
Example 1 (Solution of the univariate Kyle model). The specialisation of Theorem 1 to the n = 1 case in
which only one asset is traded yields the well-known solution derived in [Kyl85] (light lower case symbols are
scalar versions of the bold upper case and bold lower case ones):
λ =
1
2
√
σ0
ω
, (20)
indicating that the constant of proportionality between price and imbalances scales with the amount of price
fluctuations
√
σ0 and is inversely proportional to the typical fluctuations of the noise
√
ω. Intuitively, the larger
price deviations the rational MM expects, the more weight he should give to volume imbalances in order to
forecast the fundamental price to the imbalances. On the other hand, the more noise there is in the system, the
less the volume signal is reliable, so that the traded price is closer to the uninformed prior p0.
It is important to note that Eq. (16) alone does not imply symmetry of Λ, as it is necessary to further
impose PDness in order to obtain symmetry. In fact, there are symmetric solutions to (16) that are not PD.
These solutions lead to efficient traded prices but they do not optimise the IT’s utility.
Example 2 (Saddle point solutions). Let x be a strategy of the form given in (14) and let µ = p0 and let Λ
be a symmetric but not PD solution of (16). By construction, the gradient of E[UIT ] with respect to x at this
point is zero, satisfying the first order condition for the IT, but this does not guarantee that it is a maximum.
We now take an arbitrary perturbation of the strategy x+ δx and compute the difference in utility between the
two strategies:
δE[UIT ] = E[UIT ](x)− E[UIT ](x+ δx)
= E[2x>Λδx+ δx>Λδx− δx>(v − p0)]
= δx>Λδx .
One can see that δE[UIT ] is always positive for arbitrary δx if and only if Λ is PD. Without the second order
condition the IT could find better strategies than x meaning that the solution that corresponds to that Λ is not
an equilibrium but a saddle point. In fact, when Λ is not PD, E[UIT ] can be arbitrarily large.
In such a case, the IT would trade arbitrarily large quantities of some linear combinations of assets, and no
equilibrium would be possible. Imposing a PD impact matrix Λ allows the MM to fix the optimal strategy of
the IT, which otherwise would be undetermined – at least in the absence of a further risk penalty in the IT
utility function.
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3.2 Price and volume covariances of the equilibrium solution
We now investigate what are the testable implications of the linear equilibrium described above. Here, we
provide the relations between the observables that one would measure in such a situation.
Proposition 4 (Camouflage). In the equilibrium, the expectation of the dressed order imbalance is equal to:
y0 = E[y] = E[x] = 0 . (21)
The IT order imbalance covariance can be expressed as:
C[x,x] = Ω , (22)
implying that:
Ωd = 2Ω . (23)
Proof. The results in (21) and (22) are obtained by directly evaluating the expectations:
E[x] =
1
2
Λ−1E[v − p0] = 0 ,
C[x,x] =
1
4
Λ−1E[(v − p0)(v − p0)>]Λ−1 = 1
4
Λ−1Σ0Λ−1 = Ω .
The last result follows trivially from (22) and the definition of Ωd.
This result implies that, in addition to matching the trading level of the NT in order to conceal his information
(as obtained in the one-dimensional case), the IT is required to match the directions in which the NT trades
(i.e. the eigenvectors of Ω) such that the trading behaviour of the IT is indistinguishable from that of the NT.
An even more interesting consequence of this behaviour is given in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Information diffusion). The fundamental price covariance and the traded price covariance in
the equilibrium are related by:
Σ =
1
2
Σ0 . (24)
Furthermore, the residual information is
C[v,v|p] = C[v,v]− C[v,p]C[p,p]−1C[p,v]
= Σ0 −BΛΣ0Σ−1Σ0Λ>B> (25)
which at equilibrium reads
C[v,v|p] = 1
2
Σ0. (26)
Proof. The traded price covariance is obtained as:
Σ = C[p,p] = ΛΩdΛ> = 2ΛΩΛ =
1
2
Σ0 , (27)
where the last equality comes from Eq. (73) in App. A.3. To find the residual information on needs to compute
the covariance between traded prices and fundamental prices:
C[v,p] = BΛC[v,v] = BΛΣ0.
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While the fact that the two covariances are related is expected, the fact that they are proportional to one
another is non-trivial. Furthermore (27) implies that the role of the impact matrix Λ is to “rotate” the fluc-
tuations of the volume in the direction of the fluctuations of the fundamental price. The intuition behind this
behaviour is that due to camouflage the IT will trade in the same direction as the NT. Hence, a rational MM
trying to enforce price efficiency will be required to convert fluctuations along the principal components of Ω
into forecasts of price fluctuations along the principal components of Σ0, thus matching the expected covariance
Σ0. The fact that the proportionality constant is equal to 1/2 (only half of the information is revealed) is of
minor importance, and is a consequence of the single-period feature of the model. Extending the Kyle frame-
work to multiple time steps would turn the constant factor 1/2 into a time-varying function expressing the rate
at which information is incorporated into prices (see the original Kyle paper [Kyl85] for the single asset case
and [Vit12, Las04] for respectively the discrete and continuous multi-asset case).
Finally, it is interesting to characterise the responses in the context of a multivariate Kyle model.
Proposition 6 (Responses). The propositions above and Eq. (10) imply that
Rv = R
d
v = R
d = 2R =
1
2
Σ0Λ
−1 , (28)
so that the responses are uniquely determined by Σ0 and Λ.
Proof. The equilibrium values of the responses are found by plugging the equilibrium strategies on their defini-
tions:
Rdv = Rv = E[(v − p0)x>] =
1
2
E[(v − p0)(v − p0)>]Λ−1 = 1
2
Σ0Λ
−1 ,
Rd = E[(p− p0)y>] = ΛE[yy>] = 2ΛΩ = 1
2
Σ0Λ
−1 ,
R = E[(p− p0)x>] = ΛE[xx>] = ΛΩ = 1
4
Σ0Λ
−1 .
An interesting consequence of this proposition is that within the present framework, the dressed responses
should be entirely determined by Σ0 and Ω alone. In Section 5 we will see how this naturally leads to the
calibration of an impact model in which part of the estimation noise can be reduced by imposing the response
structure above as a reasonable prior. Finally, note that while the dressed and bare responses of the fundamental
price coincide, the dressed response of the traded price is a factor 2 larger than the bare response, due to the
spurious correlations between prices and volume transiently introduced by the NT.
3.3 Utilities and competitive market making
In this model the utilities of the three agents are such that they sum to zero:
UIT = −x>(p− v) ,
UNT = −u>(p− v) ,
UMM = (x+ u)>(p− v) .
It is thus interesting to characterise how utilities are transferred from one agent to the other at equilibrium.
Proposition 7 (Utilities at equilibrium). The utilities of the three agents at equilibrium are equal to
E[UIT ] = tr(R) , (29)
E[UNT ] = −tr(R) , (30)
E[UMM ] = 0 . (31)
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Proof.
E[UIT ] = −E[x>(p− v)] = tr(E[vx>]− E[px>]) = tr(Rv −R) = tr(R) ,
E[UNT ] = −E[u>(p− v)] = tr(E[vu>]− E[pu>]) = tr(0−R) = −tr(R) ,
E[UMM ] = −E[UIT ]− E[UNT ] = 0 .
As in the standard Kyle model, the linear equilibrium of the Multivariate Kyle Model is such that wealth is
transferred from the NT to the IT, which is able to capitalise his informational advantage. The role of the MM
is more subtle: we assumed that the MM enforces an efficient price, hence by construction he is not optimising
his wealth. However, as we show in Proposition 7, imposing price efficiency through the pricing rule (2) results
in a break-even for the MM in the sense that the expectation of his utility is 0. In the next example we show
that the contrary is not true: imposing the break-even condition for the MM is in general not sufficient to
ensure efficient prices.
Example 3 (Efficient prices and break-even condition). Consider the break-even condition E[UMM ] = 0. The
expected utility of the MM in the univariate model reads:
E[UMM ] = 1
2
(µ− p0)2λ−1 + λωd − rdv = 0.
Imposing µ = p0 rules out the presence of complex solutions regardless of r
d
v and ω
d and therefore:
λ = rdv/ω
d ,
µ = p0 .
Hence in one dimension a break-even condition for the MM, together with the requirement µ = p0 is equivalent
to imposing price efficiency. This equivalence stems from the low dimensionality of the system because when
we impose the break-even condition in one dimension we obtain one equation for one parameter (µ is fixed by
imposing that the solution has to be real for any choice of parameters).
In the multivariate Kyle model this is not the case. In particular, the break-even condition writes
E[UMM ] = tr
(
1
2
(µ− p0)(µ− p0)>Λ−1S + ΛΩd −Rv
)
= 0 .
In this case we obtain again one equation but we now need to fix ∼ n2 parameters. This means that there
are many ways to break-even while only one is efficient. In a more restrictive setting where the MM has to
break-even for each asset individually, the condition can be written as:
diag
(
1
2
(µ− p0)(µ− p0)>Λ−1S + ΛΩd −Rv
)
= 0. (32)
In this case there are n equations, which are still not enough to fix ∼ n2 parameters.
Therefore, in one dimension the condition E[UMM ] = 0 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the
prices to be efficient. In multiple dimensions, although E[UMM ] = 0 is still is a consequence of price efficiency,
the converse is not true, as clarified in the next remark.
Remark 1 (Sufficient and necessary conditions for efficiency). The asset-wise break even condition (32) can be
also written as:
E[(pi − vi)yi] = 0 , (33)
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for each asset i. Under the assumption µ = p0 and in matrix form, (33) leads to
0 = diag(E[(p− v)y>])
= diag(ΛE[yy>]− E[vy>])
= diag(ΛΩd −Rv)
which corresponds to the diagonal of (15). In order to recover (15) (and not only its diagonal) we need the
off-diagonal version of equation (33):
E[(pi − vi)yj ] = 0 ,
for j 6= i. Unfortunately, these terms are not directly related to any utility, and merely indicate that in order
to prices to be efficient, the MM should destroy any correlation between the order flow yj and the mispricing
pi − vi.
Hence, whereas in one dimension the behavior of a Kyle MM can be justified on the basis of utility and
competitive market making arguments (see Ref. [Kyl85]), it is much less clear why in the multi-asset case a
competitive MM would enforce price efficiency on the basis of his/her own utility alone.
4 Interpretation
The properties of the linear equilibrium that have been illustrated in the section above provide some intuition
about the phenomenology of the model, but they do not help in making sense of Eq. (17) for the impact Λ.
The following discussions are meant to provide a justification of the expression for Λ, so to shed some light on
its structure. As far as we know, the following arguments have never appeared in the literature before.
4.1 Whitening of prices and volumes
The derivation of the linear equilibrium presented in Theorem 1 relies on the quadratic matrix equation (16)
which is solved by (see proof of Proposition 11):
Λ =
1
2
GOL−1 , (34)
where we have used a decomposition for the price correlations Σ0 = GD analogous to that of Ω = LR and O is
an orthogonal matrix. The remarkable part of this finding is that, regardless of Σ0 and Ω, there always exists
a unique change of basis O such that Λ is SPD. Hence, the prediction process operated by the MM that results
into the pricing rule ∆v = v − p0 = Λy can be seen as resulting from the following steps:
1. Apply the whitening transformation L−1 to y, so to obtain the whitened imbalance y˜ = 2−1/2L−1y, with
C[y˜, y˜] = I.
2. Apply the rotation O to y˜, obtaining the whitened fundamental price variations ∆v˜ = Oy˜. As before,
one has in fact C[∆v˜,∆v˜] = E[∆v˜∆v˜>] = I.
3. Apply the inverse whitening transformation G in order to find the prediction for the fundamental price
variation ∆v = v − p0 = 2−1/2G∆v˜.
While the first and the third steps of this procedure are intuitive, and can be seen as arising from dimensional
analysis only, the nature of the rotation O applied during the second step is less trivial, and will be investigated
more closely in the following sections.
Example 4 (Degeneracy in the one-dimensional Kyle model). In one dimension Eq. (16) becomes
σ0
4
= λ2ω ,
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leading to the couple of solutions λ = ± 12
√
σ0/ω. The degeneracy between the solutions is easily resolved by
imposing positive-definiteness of the impact Λ, which selects the positive solution. In this case we have G = √σ0,
L = √ω, O = 1. Hence, the one-dimensional Kyle model has too low a dimensionality for anything non-trivial to
happen from the point of view of O: it is only in higher dimension that one can appreciate its general structure.
4.2 Basis of prices and basis of volumes
As we show in the proof of Proposition 11, the rotation O that appears in Eq. (34) can be expressed as
O = (RG)−1
√
(RG)(RG)> . (35)
In order to make some progress in understanding the complex nature of this rotation for n > 1, it is important
to notice that it is completely specified in terms of the matrix RG. Let us assume that the matrix factorization
chosen to compute Ω and Σ0 is the Principal Component Decomposition:
Ω = Wdiag(
√
ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
diag(
√
ω)W>︸ ︷︷ ︸
R
, (36)
Σ0 = Sdiag(
√
σ0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
diag(
√
σ0)S
>︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
, (37)
where W and S are orthogonal matrices, and where the vectors
√
ω and
√
σ0 have positive elements. Then we
have:
RG = diag(√ω)W>Sdiag(√σ0) , (38)
indicating that, besides the diagonal matrices diag(
√
ω) and diag(
√
σ0) that set the scale of the fluctuations of
fundamental prices and order imbalancees, it is the overlap W>S that links the eigenvectors of the volumes
with that of the fundamental price. In order to obtain a stronger insight about the structure of O, we shall
proceed with some simple examples.
Example 5 (Two-dimensional Kyle model). In two dimensions the matrix O can be characterised, without loss
of generality, by a single angle θ: 2
O =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
.
Consider a system given by the following correlations:
Σ0 =
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
, Ω =
(
ω1 0
0 ω2
)
.
In this case we can calculate O explicitly. In particular one has
G = 1√
2
(√
1 + ρ −√1− ρ√
1 + ρ
√
1− ρ
)
, L−1 =
(
ω
−1/2
1 0
0 ω
−1/2
2
)
,
and imposing the symmetry of Λ one can show that
θ = arcsin
(
ω
−1/2
1
√
1 + ρ+ ω
−1/2
2
√
1− ρ√
2∆
)
where ∆ =
√
ω1 + ω2 + 2(ω1ω2)1/2
√
1− ρ2. Finally we obtain
Λ =
1
2∆
1 +√ω2ω1√1− ρ2 ρ
ρ 1 +
√
ω1
ω2
√
1− ρ2
 . (39)
2Indeed, by consistently choosing the factorisation of G and L one can fix arbitrarily the determinant of O to be plus or minus
one due to Eq. (35).
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We can use the results in example 5 to examine a couple of extreme cases: the one of extreme illiquidity
and the one in which assets are strong correlations.
Example 6 (Extreme illiquidity). Let us consider the limit in which ω2 = ω with  → 0, whereas ω1 = ω,
implying that y2
−1/2 is expected to be finite. Then the prediction of the MM up to first order in  is:
p− p0 = 1
2
√
ω
(
y1
ρy1 +
√
1− ρ2(y2−1/2)
)
,
implying that the efficient price of a liquid instrument is fixed solely by the volume traded on that same instru-
ment, whereas for illiquid markets it is important to take into account quantities traded on liquid, correlated
markets. On the other hand, the behavior of the IT up to first order in  is given by:
x =
√
ω
(
∆v1√

1−ρ2 (∆v2 − ρ∆v1)
)
.
Now the IT is encouraged to trade only the liquid asset and furthermore ignore the illiquid one when placing the
bid. Similarly to the previous case, the traded price will remain of order one because the market orders for the
second asset will be order
√
.
Price innovation in example 6 can be interpreted as an indication of how an efficient market should work: the
symmetry of cross-impact implies that the effect of trading one dollar of a very liquid asset a1 on the price of an
iliquid asset a2 is the same as the effect of trading a dollar of asset a2 on the price of asset a1, however because
there are going to be very few dollars traded on a2 it will not affect significantly the price of a1. Conversely,
the price of a2 will be heavily driven by the traded volume of a1.
Although we only proved the existence of the linear equilibrium for invertible Σ0, we can study the behavior
of Λ in the limiting case in which Σ0 has low rank as in the two following examples:
Example 7 (Strongly-correlated prices). Consider ρ = 1 − δ, with δ → 0, so that (∆p1 −∆p2)/
√
δ is finite.
According to (39) the prediction of the MM up to first order in δ is:
p− p0 = 1
2
√
ω1 + ω2
(
y1 + y2
y1 + y2
)
,
implying that when dealing with strongly correlated instruments, the efficient prices can be built by summing
algebraically the volumes traded on each of them before normalizing by the global liquidity. On the other hand,
the bet of the IT up to first order in δ can be written as:
x =
1
2
√
1
ω1 + ω2
(
ω1(∆v1 + ∆v2)
ω2(∆v1 + ∆v2)
)
+
√
ω1ω2
2(ω1 + ω2)
(
1√
δ
(∆v1 −∆v2)
1√
δ
(∆v2 −∆v1)
)
.
In this case the IT is encouraged to place orders proportional to either the average price variation, or orders
of finite size proportional to the relative difference, rescaled by the typical size of the relative price moves
√
δ.
Indeed, the IT should bet on price variations inversely proportional to how common they are.
The specialization of the result above to the extreme case ρ→ ±1 regime is particularly interesting, because
it is a consequence of a more general result that can be applied whenever Σ0 is rank one, which is shown in the
next example.
Example 8 (Rank one price covariance). Let us consider the case in which all eigenvalues of Σ0 except for
one tend to 0, and therefore Σ0 tends to a rank 1 matrix. The interest of this example resides in the fact
that Λ displays in this case a particularly illuminating expression, providing a simple recipe for pooling together
volumes belonging to different financial instruments correlated to the same underlying product. Without loss of
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generality, Σ0 in the rank one case can be written as Σ0 = sσs
>where s ∈ Rn is a unit vector and σ > 0. It is
then straightforward to verify that the matrix
Λ =
1
2
s
( σ
s>Ωs
)1/2
s> (40)
yields the linear equilibrium of the model. The above equation has a very simple interpretation:
• The matrix Λ commutes with Σ0, and its eigenvectors are insensitive to those of Ω (i.e., the volume
fluctuations induced by noise traders).
• The factor σ1/2 sets the scale for the price variations as being that of the only mode of Σ0 that has non-zero
fluctuations.
• By writing the principal component decomposition of Ω as Ω = ∑na=1waωaw>a , one can write the denom-
inator as:
(s>Ωs)1/2 =
(
n∑
a=1
(w>a s)
2ωa
)1/2
. (41)
Such a denominator sets the scaling with volume of the impact Λ. It amounts to a projection of Ω on the
only non-zero mode of Σ0, or equivalently a sum of the individual volume variances ωa of Ω, weighted by
their projections on s.
5 Implications
The expression (17) for the impact matrix Λ is of interest beyond the context of the Kyle Model. It provides
an insightful inference prescription for cross-impact models, as opposed to what has been done so far in the
context of cross-impact fitting (see [BMEB17, MBEB17, WSG16, SL18]). In such a context, one is interested
in estimating from empirical data a model to forecast a price variation ∆p with a predictor of the form:
∆ˆp = Λˆy , (42)
in which it is essential to faithfully model how trading the instrument i will impact the instrument j. The goal
of this section is to establish a link between the Kyle model and the empirical calibration of Eq. (42), where
the price variations ∆p and the imbalances y are sampled from empirical data.
5.1 From theory to data: empirical averages and loss function
First, let us consider a dataset of T i.i.d. efficient price variations and volumes, {∆p(t)}Tt=1 and {y(t)}Tt=1,
sampled from an unknown distribution with bounded variance that needs not to be related to the Kyle model
presented in the previous sections of the manuscript. Accordingly, with a slight abuse of notation, from now on
E[·] denotes the averages taken with respect to the underlying distribution from which ∆p and y are sampled.
In addition, we introduce an empirical measure 〈·〉 to denote the averages with respect to the empirical sample
under investigation. In particular, simple empirical estimators for the average price variation and the mean
imbalance write:
pˆ0 = 〈∆p〉 = 1
T
T∑
t=1
∆p(t) (43)
yˆ0 = 〈y〉 = 1
T
T∑
t=1
y(t) . (44)
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Henceforth, we consider that price changes and order flows are shifted by their empirical mean pˆ0 and yˆ0, and
therefore we set pˆ0 = yˆ0 = 0. The corresponding covariances are then defined accordingly as:
Σˆ = 〈∆p∆p>〉 , (45)
Ωˆd = 〈yy>〉 , (46)
Rˆd = 〈∆py>〉 . (47)
As T →∞, the empirical averages converge to the actual means and covariances. Our goal is to show different
recipes for the calibration of the model (42), all relying on the estimators above. We shall compare such
estimators with the Kyle estimator ΛˆKyle, which, as we shall see, displays several interesting properties. In
order to evaluate the quality of different calibrations, we consider a quadratic loss χ2 defined below.
Definition 2 (Loss). Given an empirical measure 〈·〉, we define the loss χ2 as the function
χ2 =
1
2
〈
(∆ˆp−∆p)>M(∆ˆp−∆p)
〉
, (48)
where ∆ˆp = Λˆy is a linear predictor of the efficient price variation and M is a SPD matrix.
This definition of the loss implicitly implies that the calibration of the model is very similar to the task
of the market maker in the Kyle model: whereas in the latter the job of the MM is to forecast what the
fundamental price variation is on the basis of the order flow imbalance, in this setting one is required to forecast
the efficient (observed) price on the basis of the imbalance. Even though the two problems are different, they
involve extremely similar equations, a fact that will allow us to leverage the results of the previous sections,
valid in principle for a Kyle Market Maker, in the calibration setting. Hence, under this definition of loss one
is only required to find proxies for the price variations ∆p and the dressed order imbalance y, disregarding in
principle the realisations of the underlying fundamental price v.
5.2 Cross-impact estimators
Here we present three different cross-impact estimators and discuss their properties. The proofs of the propo-
sitions in this section are provided in App. B.
5.2.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The simplest estimation recipe that one can construct in order to estimate the cross-impact matrix Λ is probably
the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE): ΛˆMLE, that is obtained by minimising a quadratic loss.
Proposition 8. The minimisation of the loss χ2 with respect to ΛˆMLE yields:
ΛˆMLE = Rˆ
d(Ωˆd)−1 , (49)
independent of M . The loss at the minimum is given by:
χ2MLE =
1
2
tr
(
M(Σˆ− ΣˆMLE)
)
, (50)
where ΣˆMLE = Rˆ
d(Ωˆd)−1(Rˆd)> is the portion of the covariance of fundamental price variations explained by
the model (49).
Note that Eq. (49) is almost identical to Eq. (15), that has been obtained by enforcing the efficient price
condition. This is no coincidence, as in a linear equilibrium setting with normally distributed variables the traded
price is exactly a linear function of the order flow imbalance y. There are though two important differences
distinguishing the linear equilibrium of the Kyle model and the minimization of χ2MLE:
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• A MM in the Kyle setting is actually performing a linear regression of the fundamental price, whereas
here we are interested in regressing the efficient price. This justifies why Eq. (15) uses the fundamental
price response Rdv, as opposed to Eq. (49) that uses the efficient price R
d.
• In the Kyle setup case, the MM is aware that a part of the order imbalance comes from the IT who owns
information about the fundamental price and is optimising his strategy assuming that the MM uses a
MLE. This leads to a quadratic equation for Λ (see Eq. (57) below) even in the linear equilibrium setting,
whereas Eq. (49) above is a linear relation for ΛˆMLE.
Remark 2. One could have defined the Multivariate Kyle Model by replacing the efficient-price condition (see
Eq. (2)) with a condition on the minimisation of χ2 without affecting the linear equilibrium. Moreover, this
approach would do a better job at generalising the model to more exotic settings. In fact, Eq. (??) provides
a linear predictor only under the assumption of normality for prices and volumes: for other distributions, the
relation linking y and v is in general non-linear. Having a MM that minimises a loss χ2 is a reasonable
assumption if one thinks that a MM without enough knowledge of the underlying distributions or computational
power to build an efficient price should rely on linear regressions in order to estimate the latter.
The expression for ΛˆMLE only contains the dressed empirical estimators Rˆ
d and Ωˆd, allowing one to estimate
the impact matrix from real data. In addition, such an estimator has the benefit of being very simple to
implement, as it only requires the solution of a linear equation for ΛˆMLE. Unfortunately, this estimator lacks
several properties that turn out to be very useful in cases of practical interest:
Symmetry The matrix ΛˆMLE is symmetric if and only if Rˆ
d and Ωˆd commute.
Positive definiteness The matrix ΛˆMLE can have negative eigenvalues (see [BMEB17]).
Consistency of correlations In general, [Σˆ, ΣˆMLE] 6= 0. Hence, the price variations inferred by using the
order flow imbalance do not share the eigenvectors of the real price variations, unless the response
Rˆd(Ωˆd)−1Rˆd commutes with Σˆ.
The first two properties are extremely important in the calibration of cross-impact models, as shown in [AKS16,
SL18]: to perform pricing within a cross-impact setup, the matrix Λ should be SPD in order to ensure absence
of price manipulation. This is not the case for a MLE, which is thus not suitable for practical purposes.
5.2.2 EigenLiquidity model
In order to cure the lack of symmetry of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator, the idea proposed in Ref. [MBEB17]
is to construct an estimator of cross-impact ΛˆELM that is symmetric by construction, by enforcing the relation:
[ΛˆELM, Σˆ] = 0 , (51)
which means that the impact eigendirections coincide with the eigenportfolios (or principal components of the
asset space). This prevents price manipulations that would be induced by an asymmetric of Λ. Its calibration
is explained in the next proposition.
Proposition 9. Consider a pricing rule ∆ˆp = ΛˆELMy, in which we impose the commutation relation (51).
Then, the maximum likelihood estimator obtained under such constraint takes the form:
ΛˆELM =
n∑
a=1
sˆagasˆ
>
a , (52)
where {sˆa}na=1 are the empirical eigenvectors of Σˆ, and where:
ga =
sˆ>a Rˆ
dsˆa
sˆ>a Ωˆdsˆa
. (53)
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Furthermore, the loss at the minimum is given by:
χ2ELM =
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ− Rˆd
n∑
a=1
sˆa
sˆ>a Rˆ
dsˆa
sˆ>a Ωˆdsˆa
sˆ>a
)]
. (54)
In this case, the properties discussed above become:
Symmetry The matrix ΛˆELM is symmetric by construction.
Positive definiteness The matrix ΛˆELM can still have negative eigenvalues, although empirically the matrix
ΛˆELM has been reported not to display eigenvalues significantly smaller than zero (see [MBEB17]).
Consistency of correlations Similarly to the MLE case, the price variation covariances ΣˆELM = ΛˆELMΩˆ
dΛˆELM
do not generally commute with Σˆ. It is the case if and only if [Ωˆd, Σˆ] = 0.
Summarizing, the price to pay in order to have a symmetric estimator is a larger loss function. Note that if
Rˆd and Ωˆd commute with Σˆ, then ΛˆELM = (Rˆ
d)2(Ωˆd)−1 = ΛˆMLE and therefore the loss is equal to the best
possible χ2ELM = χ
2
MLE.
Remark 3 (Estimators in one dimension). Since commutation and symmetry are granted in one dimension,
imposing the condition (51) does not add any constraints to the minimization of the loss function and therefore
λˆELM = λˆMLE =
rd
ωd
.
5.2.3 Kyle estimator
Now, let us provide some intuition on how to construct an impact estimator inspired by Kyle’s model, ΛˆKyle,
by characterising the Λ in the Kyle model from a different perspective. First, take the MM solution Eq. (15)
(matching the MLE, Eq. (49)), and exchange the dressed order imbalancees and responses with those predicted
in the linear equilibrium through Eqs. (28) and (23):
Rdv →
1
2
Σ0Λ
−1 , (55)
Ωd → 2Ω . (56)
Then, the linear regression of Eq. (15) becomes a quadratic matrix equation:
Λ = Rdv(Ω
d)−1 → Λ = 1
4
Σ0Λ
−1Ω−1 . (57)
After imposing symmetry and positive definiteness of Λ, this is exactly the equation that leads to the expression
of Λ obtained in the Kyle linear equilibrium (see App. A.4). By doing so, one ensures an efficient price variation
process whose associated covariance is half that of the “true” price variations. As alluded to above, in the Kyle
setup the MM is implicitly performing a linear regression, and knows that the IT is aware of his/her algorithm,
finally leading to Eq. (57). We now propose an estimator ΛˆKyle that exploits these ideas.
Proposition 10. Let us consider an estimator ∆ˆp := ΛˆKyley such that
• ΛˆKyle is SPD
• The empirical covariance of the associated efficient price variations ΣˆKyle = 〈∆ˆp∆ˆp>〉 satisfies
ΣˆKyle = k
2Σˆ
with k ∈ R. Then the unique ΛˆKyle satisfying these constraints is given by
ΛˆKyle = k(Rˆd)−1
√
RˆdΣˆLˆd(Lˆd)−1 (58)
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where Ωˆd = LˆdRˆd is a decomposition of Ωˆd such that Lˆd = (Rˆd)>.
Moreover, the loss at the minimum is
χ2Kyle =
1
2
tr
[
M
(
(1 + k2)Σˆ− 2kRˆd(Rˆd)−1
√
RˆdΣˆLˆd(Lˆd)−1
)]
(59)
and the value of k that minimizes the loss is given by
k? =
tr(MRˆd(Rˆd)−1
√
RˆdΣˆLˆd(Lˆd)−1)
tr(MΣˆ)
.
Note that the complete analogy with the Kyle model is recovered for k = 1. In fact, if the sample dataset
is drawn from an actual Multivariate Kyle Model with Σ0/2 = Σ = Σˆ and 2Ω = Ω
d = Ωˆd as described in the
previous sections, one obtains:
E[ΛˆKyle]
T→∞−−−−→ kΛ .
The advantage of leaving k as a free parameter is that it allows to increase or decrease the loss χ2 of the Kyle es-
timator without affecting the eigenvectors of the predicted covariance. In fact, the relationship 2Σ = Σ0 arising
in the Kyle model is thought not to be universal, so that it is more natural to think of it as a phenomenological
parameter expressing the informational content of trades.
The adoption of ΛˆKyle as an estimator of cross-impact has several interesting advantages with respect to
more customary estimators such as the Maximum Likelihood Estimator ΛˆMLE or an impact estimator based on
the Eigen-Liquidity Model ΛˆELM:
Symmetry and positive definiteness The Kyle construction imposes a priori symmetry and PDness due
to the request of optimality of the IT. In fact, the optimality condition (14) and the stability one (PDness of Λ)
are exactly the ones that a risk-neutral rational agent, as considered in [AKS16, SL18], would face when trying
to optimise his profits.
Consistency of correlations This construction allows to recover the empirical correlations Σˆ for k = 1. For
any value of k one has [Σˆ, ΣˆKyle] = 0.
Loss An important point concerns the loss function obtained by using ΛˆKyle. In general χ
2
Kyle is larger than
that obtained by doing Maximum Likelihood Estimation, which minimizes χ2 by design. Hence, the price to
pay in order to have symmetry, positive semi-definiteness and consistency of correlations is in general a worse
fit of empirical data with respect to ΛˆMLE (as measured by the loss χ
2). However, if our data behaves as the
Kyle model, i.e. if Rˆd = ΣˆΛˆ−1Kyle then k
? = 1 and:
χ2Kyle = 0 = χ
2
MLE ,
implying that Λ is (obviously! ) the best estimator for a market that reproduces the statistics of the multivariate
Kyle model. Moreover, the loss at the minimum is zero because the efficient price variation ∆p is completely
determined by the imbalance. Indeed, the problem of regressing the fundamental price variation ∆v would have
yielded a non-zero loss at the minimum even for data sampled from an actual Kyle model due to the relation
Σ < Σ0.
Remark 4 (ELM and Kyle estimators for rank one Σˆ). As we showed in example 8, when the price variation
covariance is rank one ΛˆKyle is proportional to Σˆ. On the other hand, ΛˆELM has, by definition, the same
eigenbasis as the price variations covariance. Therefore, if Σˆ is rank one then ΛˆELM is proportional to ΛˆKyle
and Σˆ.
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5.3 A comparison of recipes
In order to compare the performance of the estimators we compute observables that are directly related to the
properties discused above:
• Loss: we compute the loss χ2 as given in Eq. (48).
• Asymmetry: to quantify the degree of symmetry of the estimator we compute the norm of its antisym-
metric part divided by the total norm:
α =
|Λˆ− Λˆ>|
2|Λˆ| .
The value α = 0 (α = 1) means that the estimator is symmetric (antisymmetric).
• Positive definiteness: we compute the lowest real part of the spectrum of the estimator:
λ? = min
i
<(λˆi) ,
where {λˆi}1≥i≥n are the eigenvalues of Λˆ. Positive definiteness is equivalent to λ? > 0.
• Consistency of correlations: we compute the norm of the commutator of Σˆ and the covariances of the
estimated price variations Σˆest:
κ =
|ΣˆestΣˆ− ΣˆΣˆest|
|Σˆ||Σˆest|
.
Correlations are consistent if κ = 0.
5.3.1 Application to real data
In Fig. 1 we show the covariances and estimators for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year tenors of the U.S.
Treasury Futures traded in the Chicago Board of Trade (see B.5 for details). In Table 1 we show the values
of the observables corresponding to the 4 × 4 system. In Table 2 we show the values of the same obserbavles
but averaged over the 6 possible combinations of 2× 2 systems. As expected, the Kyle procedure fares slightly
worse for the loss function, but is much better than other procedures on all other counts.
Estimator Loss (χ2) Commutator (κ) PDness (λ?) Asymmetry (α)
ΛˆMLE 1.20 0.038 0.031 0.31
ΛˆELM 1.26 0.129 0.017 0
ΛˆKyle 1.32 0 0.386 0
Table 1: Values of the observables for the three estimators for U.S. Treasury Futures and Bonds.
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0.032 0.15 1 0.26
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0.013 0.01 0.032 0.015
Ωˆd
0.035 0.14 0.54 0.29
0.039 0.15 0.57 0.27
0.043 0.15 0.54 0.25
0.051 0.12 0.42 0.18
Rˆd
0.89 0.46 0.28 0.62
1.2 0.58 0.33 0.45
1.5 0.66 0.3 0.38
2.8 0.46 0.21 0.21
ΛˆMLE
0.21 0.34 0.4 0.51
0.28 0.43 0.46 0.4
0.33 0.46 0.43 0.34
0.55 0.33 0.28 0.21
ΛˆELM
0.0081 0.19 0.29 1.1
0.24 0.39 0.62 0.29
0.57 1.3 0.39 0.19
5 0.57 0.24 0.0081
ΛˆKyle
Figure 1: Averaged US Treasury Futures covariances and impact estimators for 2016.
Top from left to right: Daily averaged price variation covariances in untis of risk squared. Unitless daily aver-
aged volume covariances rescaled with respect to the maximum. To obtain the original volumes Ωˆd has to be
multiplied by 2242$2. Market response rescaled with respect to the maximal volume in units of risk. To obtain
the original volumes Rˆd has to be multiplied by
√
2242$.
Bottom from left to right: Maximum Likelyhood impact estimator, EigenLiquidity Model based impact esti-
mator and Kyle model based impact estimator in units of risk. To obtain the estimators in the right units they
have to be divided by
√
2242$.
Estimator Loss (χ2) Commutator (κ) PDness (λ?) Asymmetry (α)
ΛˆMLE 0.668 0.033 0.318 0.186
ΛˆELM 0.691 0.108 0.231 0
ΛˆKyle 0.718 0 0.952 0
Table 2: Average values of the observables for the three estimators for the 6 pairs of U.S. Treasury Futures.
5.3.2 Synthetic data
To further explore the effects of price variation and liquidity correlations, in the next two sections we compute
the values of the observables described above on the 6 sets of synthetic 2× 2 covariance matrices with specific
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Figure 2: Effect of liquidity. Averaged values (solid lines) and intervals between the maximum and the
minimum (shaded area) of the observables for  ranging from 0 to 1.
price variation covariances (Σˆρ, Ωˆ
d
ρ, Rˆ
d
ρ) and specific volume covariances (Σˆ, Ωˆ
d
 , Rˆ
d
 ) respectively fabricated
by modifying the data for U.S. Treasury Futures as explained in B.5 (see Table 2). The idea behind this
construction is to provide a synthetic but realistic set of matrices that are parametrized by either a liquidity
parameter  or a correlation parameter ρ. By varying those parameters, one can extrapolate from the reality
(recovered for specific values of  and/or ρ) and a fictitious world in which assets can be made more or less
liquid with respected to reality by varying the knob , and more or less correlated by varying the parameter ρ.
Extreme illiquidity In order to explore the effect of extreme heterogeneous liquidities we rescale the 2 × 2
covariances as:
Ωˆd 7→ Ωˆd =
(
1
√
 Ωˆd12√
 Ωˆd12 
)
.
In Fig. 2 we show the value of each of the observables averaged over the 6 sets of covariances for  ranging
from 0 to 1. Regarding the loss, the estimator that better performs is ΛˆMLE, regardless of  as expected. It
is interesting to observe that χ2MLE does not depend on . The reason is that, by construction, the estimated
price variation covariances are invariant under changes in the volume variances3:
ΣˆMLE = Rˆ
d
 (Ωˆ
d
 )
−1(Rˆd )
> = Rˆd(Ωˆd)−1(Rˆd)>.
The loss of the other two estimators depends on . For small values of , χ2Kyle is lower than χ
2
ELM, suggesting
that ΛˆKyle might be better in case of markets with heterogeneous volatilities. For  & 0.2 the loss distributions
for the three estimators have a lot of overlap and no one is significantly better. As explained above, κMLE does
not depend on  and κKyle = 0, by construction. On the other hand, the limit κELM decreases to 0 as  → 1
because in the limit  = 1, Ωˆd and Σˆ commute. All estimators are PD, and the only non-symmetric estimator
is ΛˆMLE, whose antisymmetric part decreases as  increases (even though it never becomes fully symmetric).
The other two are symmetric by construction.
Reminiscent to what we showed in example 6, in Fig. 3 we display the covariance matrices and the three
corresponding impact estimators in a case where one of the assets’ liquidity is much smaller than the other one.
Note that due to the lack of liquidity of the second asset the second column of Rˆd is considerably smaller than
the first one while price covariances are not changed. Let us analyze heuristically the estimators obtained:
• ΛˆMLE: Trading the second asset will have a strong impact on its price and a significant impact on the
price of first asset (due to the non-negligible price correlations). Trading the first asset will have little
impact on both prices.
• ΛˆELM: In this case the impact estimator predicts that trading either asset will have a similar impact.
3This is not a particular property of systems in 2 dimensions, it holds for all dimensions.
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Figure 3: Extreme illiquidity. Covariance matrices and estimators with an illiquid asset. The value of
ρ = 0.77 is the empirical correlation of the representative pair 2USNOTES-5USNOTES, whereas the value of
 = 0.01 is obtained by rescaling the empirical responses and volume covariances of the same pair.
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Figure 4: Effect of price variation correlations Averaged values (solid lines) and intervals between the
maximum and the minimum (shaded area) of the observables for ρ ranging from 0 to 1.
• ΛˆKyle: The main difference between the predictions of the Kyle estimator and ΛˆMLE is that in this case
trading the second asset will strongly modify its price but it will have very little impact on the first assets’
price. As already emphasized, this is how efficient markets should work: liquid instruments should not
be affected by the order flow on correlated illiquid instruments, otherwise price manipulation strategies
would be possible.
Extreme correlations We now look at a linear combinations of two of the assets with price variation covari-
ances:
Σˆ 7→ Σˆρ =
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
.
In Fig. 4 we show the value of each of the observables averaged over the 6 sets of covariances for  ranging
from 0 to 1. The loss of all estimators decreases as ρ→ 1 and as in the previous case, the distributions have a
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strong overlap, suggesting again that no one estimator is significantly better at minimizing the loss.
By construction κKyle=0, and in this case κELM = 0 because Ωˆ
d
ρ commutes with Σˆρ (it would not be the
case if the volume variances were not the same). Also κMLE = 0 for ρ = 0 because in that case Σˆρ = I, but
for ρ > 0, κMLE > 0. The distributions of λ
?
ELM and λ
?
MLE are essentially the same. λ
?
Kyle is significantly larger
than the other two for all values of ρ. Asymmetries in ΛˆMLE are amplified as ρ → 1 because in that limit Ωˆdρ
becomes singular.
Again, following example 7 in Fig. 5 we show the covariance matrices and the three corresponding impact
estimators for a case where the price variations of the two assets are strongly correlated. Let us analyze the
estimators obtained:
• ΛˆMLE: Small arbitrary fluctuations in Rˆdρ are amplified due to the strong volume correlations that result
from the transformation. In the example shown in the figure the impact on the second asset is much larger
than on the first one.
• ΛˆELM: Self impact and cross-impact are comparable. Furthermore, self-impact is very similar for both
assets.
• ΛˆKyle: Self-impact is very similar for both assets and stronger than cross-impact.
6 Conclusion
In the present work we studied a Multivariate Kyle model, that proved to be a very interesting setting to
understand the fundamental mechanisms underlying cross-impact. Perhaps more importantly, the Multivariate
Kyle model suggests a practical recipe to extract a consistent cross-impact matrix structure from empirical data
– a point that does not seem to have been emphasized before but that becomes crucial when dealing with present
day large dimensional data. We recovered the Caballe´-Krishnan solution at equilibrium and proved the unicity
of the symmetric solution. We provided an interpretation of the results with regard to the eigen-modes of returns
and volumes covariances. We discussed the implications of the model for pricing, with a particular focus on
the SPD property of the impact matrix. We presented the implications for cross-impact regression of empirical
data, and showed that cross-awareness (or in lesser terms “I know that you know”) can be used as powerful
regulariser with small loss in predictive power. We confronted our results with previous empirical cross-impact
analyses, and identified limiting regimes in which the results in [BMEB17, MBEB17] are reproduced.
From a complementary point of view, our results can be seen as proxies for the behavior of an idealized
market in which prices fully reflect the information encoded in the order flow: for a manipulation-free market,
prices of liquid securities should be insensitive to trading of strongly illiquid instruments (see example 6), whereas
prices of strongly correlated instruments should be insensitive to how they are individually traded (example 7).
Measuring how much real markets violate these principles would be an interesting empirical application of our
results, that could be used to assist regulators in order to assess the vulnerability of a market to correlated
trading activity.
In spite of all the “good” properties of the Kyle cross-impact estimator, one should keep in mind that many
important aspects are left out of the Kyle framework, that may play a crucial role in practice. First of all,
the empirical order flow is strongly autocorrelated in time, which must induce a non-trivial lag dependence of
the impact function – as found in [BMEB17]. Extending the present theory to predict a lag-dependent impact
matrix Λ(τ) would be extremely useful. Second, impact is non-linear in traded quantities: it is now well accepted
that the impact of a metaorder has a square-root dependence on volume. How this single asset square-root law
generalizes in a multiasset context is, as far as we are aware, a completely open problem. Finally, it would be
interesting to extend to the multivariate case some recent extensions of the Kyle model that accounts for the
inventory risk of the market maker [C¸D+16]. We hope to visit some of these questions in future work.
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Figure 5: Strong price variation correlations. Covariance matrices and estimators with strongly correlated
price variations (ρ = 0.99)
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A Solution of the Multivariate Kyle model
The proof of Theorem 1 is split in 4 different results. First, the fact that the equilibrium is linear is a consequence
of Propositions 1 and 2. Before finding the explicit form of the equilibrium we need to show that Λ is symmetric.
This is a consequence of the second order condition on the minimization of the IT’s strategy (Proposition 1)
and is proven in Proposition 3. Finally, the explicit form and proof of uniqueness of Λ is given in Proposition
11
A.1 Optimality of the Informed Trader
Proof of Proposition 1. Here, we show the consequences of the first and second order conditions arising from
the requirement that the IT is maximizing locally the average utility given v, which can be written as:
E[UIT |v] = −E[x>(p− v)|v]
= −E[x>(µ+ Λy − v)|v]
= −x>µ− x>Λx+ x>v.
In order to find the optimal strategy, we maximize the utility with respect to x. The first and seccond order
derivatives are:
∂E[UIT |v]
∂x
= −µ− 2ΛSx+ v = 0 (60)
∂2E[UIT |v]
∂x∂x>
= −2ΛS. (61)
where XS (XA) denotes the symmetric (antisymmetric) part of X.
Since UIT is quadratic on x, the profit maximization condition implies that the second derivative (61) has to be
strictly negative definite, which in turn implies that both Λ and ΛS have to be PD. Solving (60) for x leads to
x = α+Bv (62)
where
α = −Bµ
B =
1
2
Λ−1S .
(63)
Since ΛS has to be PD, it is invertible and B and α are well defined.
As we will show in App. A.3, PDness of Λ together with the efficient-price condition (discussed in App. A.2)
implies that Λ is symmetric.
A.2 Optimality of the Market Maker
In this Appendix we will state the conditions stemming from the requirement that the MM fixes a pricing rule
p = Λy + µ such that p = E[v|y] is an efficient price.
Proof of Proposition 2. Exploiting the Gaussian nature of v and u and their independence, the efficient price
as given in (2) can be expanded as [LRS13, p. 269]:
p = E[v|y] = E[v] + C[v,y]C[y,y]−1(y − E[y])
= p0 +R
d
v(Ω
d)−1(y − y0)
= µ+ Λy , (64)
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where
µ = p0 −Λy0 , (65)
Λ = Rdv(Ω
d)−1. (66)
This analysis provides an explicit form for the MM’s strategy and it might look as if the MM is doing a linear
regression. However, without knowing the strategy of the IT one cannot estimate Rdv nor (Ω
d)−1 meaning that
the MM has to include information about x in his regression making it a quadratic problem rather than a linear
one. This point is discussed in more detail in Sec. 5.2.1.
A.3 Symmetry of the linear equilibrium
In order to find the linear equilibrium described in Theorem 1, we first have to prove the proposition 3. To do
so we will make use of an useful lemma [HJ85, Theorem 7.2.6] that will be used in the following derivations.
Lemma 1 (Positive definite square-root). Consider a matrix Y that is symmetric and positive semi-definite.
Then, it exists a unique symmetric, positive semi-definite matrix X =
√
Y such that XX = Y .
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us start by plugging E[y] = y0 = 12Λ
−1
S (p0−µ) into (15). After a bit of algebra we
obtain
(p0 − µ)(I− 1
2
ΛΛ−1S ) = 0 (67)
thus µ = p0 and x =
1
2Λ
−1
S (v − p0) which allows us to compute the following quantities:
y0 = 0 (68)
Ωd =
1
4
Λ−1S Σ0Λ
−1
S + Ω (69)
Rdv =
1
2
Σ0Λ
−1
S . (70)
By plugging the results above into (15) one obtains a quadratic equation:
(ΛΛ−1S − 2I)
1
4
Σ0 + ΛΩΛS = 0. (71)
Expanding Λ as (ΛA + ΛS) and doing some algebra from (71) we obtain
ΛA = (I− Γ)(I+ Γ)−1ΛS (72)
where Γ = 4ΛSΩΛSΣ
−1
0 . Now, since ΛA =
1
2 (Λ−Λ>), we have ΛA = −Λ>A and therefore
(I− Γ)(I+ Γ)−1ΛS = −ΛS(I+ Γ>)−1(I− Γ>)
(I+ Γ>)Λ−1S (I− Γ) = −(I− Γ>)Λ−1S (I+ Γ)√
ΛSΓ
>Λ−1S Γ
√
ΛS = I.
Substituting back Γ we get
Y 2 = Z2
where Y =
√
ΛSΩ
√
ΛS and Z =
√
Λ−1S
1
4Σ0
√
Λ−1S . Since ΛS is PD, Y
2 is also SPD and therefore Y = Z is
the unique PD square root of Y 2 which leads to
1
4
Σ0 = ΛSΩΛS (73)
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and substituting these results into (72) reveals that ΛA = 0.
With equation (73) we prove that the profit maximization condition on the IT’s cost (i.e. Λ has to be PD)
results in ΛA = 0 and Λ = ΛS. If ΛS was not PD, Y and Z could be different roots and we would not be able
to establish the relationship Y = Z. In that case we would find many solutions, most of them being saddle
points for E[UIT ].
A.4 Explicit form of the linear equilibrium
The last step needed in order to prove the existence and uniqueness the linear equilibrium in Theorem 1 is to
prove that Eq. (73) admits a unique symmetric solution, as made explicit below.
Proposition 11. The unique symmetric PD matrix Λ satisfying Eq. (73) is
Λ =
1
2
R−1
√
RΣ0LL−1 .
Proof. Explicit form of Λ: The solution to Eq. (73) has to be a Λ of the form
Λ =
1
2
GOL−1 , (74)
where G is any factorization of Σ0 of the form GD with G> = D. One is then left with the equation OO> = I.
Such equation is solved by any matrixO belonging to the orthogonal group O(n), which is specified by n(n−1)/2
parameters. It is only by self-consistently imposing symmetry of Λ that one finds the solution for O
O = G−1R−1
√
RΣ0L
= (RG)−1
√
(RG)(RG)>. (75)
Introducing this value of O in Eq. (74) we obtain the desired result.
Uniqueness: The decomposition Ω = LR is not unique. Indeed, multiplying L by an arbitrary rotation OΩ
yields another possible decomposition. However the final value of Λ does not depend on OΩ. To prove this
consider the value of Λ using the decomposition Ω = LOΩO>ΩR:
Λ =
1
2
(O>ΩR)−1
√
O>ΩRΣ0LOΩ(LOΩ)−1
=
1
2
R−1OΩO>Ω
√
RΣ0LOΩO>ΩL−1
=
1
2
R−1
√
RΣ0LL−1
where we have used the fact that if
√
Y = X then
√
O>Y O = O>XO. Since the argument of the square root
is SPD by construction the unique value of Λ is obtained by choosing the unique SPD root.
B Estimation
B.1 The loss χ2
First, we want to relate the loss (48) with the empirical mean and covariances defined in Sec. 5. Starting from
the definition (48), one can write
χ2 =
1
2
〈(Λˆy −∆p)>M(Λˆy −∆p)〉 ,
=
1
2
〈y>Λˆ>MΛˆy〉 − 〈y>Λˆ>M∆p〉+ 1
2
〈∆p>M∆p〉
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Then, by plugging the definitions of the empirical covariances one is left with
χ2 =
1
2
tr
[
Λˆ>MΛˆΩˆd − 2Λˆ>MRˆd +MΣˆ
]
(76)
B.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimator
Proof of Proposition 8. In order to derive the Maximum Likelihood estimator, we differentiate (76) ith respect
to Λˆ:
0 =
∂χ2
∂Λˆ
= M(ΛˆΩˆd − Rˆd).
It is clear that the optimal value of ΛˆMLE does no depend on M . To find the explicit expression we equate the
derivative to 0 and solve:
ΛˆMLE = Rˆ
d(Ωˆd)−1.
To calculate the minimum we can plug this solution into Eq. (76), obtaining
χ2MLE =
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ− Rˆd(Ωˆd)−1(Rˆd)>
)]
. (77)
B.3 EigenLiquidity Estimator
The derivation of the EigenLiquidity Estimator runs along the same lines as the previous case.
Proof of Proposition 9. We want to find an estimator ΛˆELM that minimizes χ
2 under the constraint [ΛˆELM, Σˆ] =
0 which is equivalent to saying that
ΛˆELM =
n∑
a=1
sˆagasˆ
>
a
where {sˆa}na=1 are the eigenvectors of Σˆ. Because of this constraint, the minimization of χ2 has to be done
with respect to ga rather than Λˆ:
0 =
∂χ2
∂ga
= tr
(
M(ΛˆΩˆd − Rˆd)sˆasˆ>a
)
,
which for arbitrary M implies
sˆ>a (ΛˆΩˆ
d − Rˆd)sˆa = 0
and therefore
ga =
sˆ>a Rˆ
dsˆa
sˆ>a Ωˆdsˆa
.
In order to compute the minimum loss we proceed as in the previous case plugging the value of ΛˆELM into
equation (76) and obtain
χ2ELM =
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ + (ΛˆELMΩˆ
d − 2Rˆd)ΛˆELM
)]
=
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ− RˆdΛˆELM
)]
=
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ− Rˆd
n∑
a=1
sˆa
sˆ>a Rˆ
dsˆa
sˆ>a Ωˆdsˆa
sˆ>a
)]
.
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B.4 Kyle Estimator
Proof of Proposition 10 To prove the first statement of the proposition it suffices to compute the covariance of
the efficient prices:
ΣˆKyle =〈∆ˆp∆ˆp>〉 = ΛˆKyle〈yy>〉Λˆ>Kyle = ΛˆKyleΩˆdΛˆ>Kyle = k2Σˆ ,
and to use the unicity result for the above equation (proved in App. A.4) in order to recover Eq. (58).
In order to find the loss at the minimum one has to take into account that the only free parameter is k, and
since ΛˆKyleΩˆ
dΛˆKyle = k
2Σˆ, the loss is
χ2Kyle =
1
2
tr
[
M
(
Σˆ + (ΛˆELMΩˆ
d − 2Rˆd)ΛˆKyle
)]
=
1
2
tr
[
M
(
(1 + k2)Σˆ− 2kRˆd(Rˆd)−1
√
RˆdΣˆLˆd(Lˆd)−1
)]
.
Optimizing with respect to k we obtain
∂χ2Kyle
∂k
= ktr
[
MΣˆ
]
− tr
[
MRˆd(Rˆd)−1
√
RˆdΣˆLˆd(Lˆd)−1
]
= 0 .
B.5 Fabricating synthetic covariance matrices inspired from real data
The data set used to fabricate the synthetic covariance matrices in section 5.3 consists of the averaged price
variations and volumes in 5 minute bins of the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 30-year tenors of the U.S. Treasury
Futures traded in the Chicago Board of Trade during the year 2016.
For each pair of bonds with price variations ∆p(t) and volumes y(t) we define the normalized covariances as
C =
(
Σˆ (Rˆd)>
Rˆd Ωˆd
)
= D−1
(〈∆p∆p>〉 〈y∆p>〉
〈∆py>〉 〈yy>〉
)
D−1
where we have previously shifted the data by their empirical means and where
D = diag
(√
〈∆p21〉,
√
〈∆p22〉,
√
〈y21〉,
√
〈y22〉
)
.
Fixing liquidity: Covariance matrices with the desired liquidity are constructed by rescaling the rows and
columns of C
C =
(
Σˆ (Rˆ
d
 )
>
Rˆd Ωˆ
d

)
=

1 0
1
1
0
√

C

1 0
1
1
0
√

 .
Using this recipe, the variance of the volume of the second asset will be  and consequently the second column
of the response is multiplied by
√
. Note that the price variations are unchanged.
Fixing correlations: In order to modify the price correlations we have to construct lineal combinations of
assets. If Σˆ12 = r , then
Cρ =
(
Σˆρ (Rˆ
d
ρ)
>
Rˆdρ Ωˆ
d
ρ
)
=
(
A 0
0 A
)
C
(
A 0
0 A
)
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where
A =
(
1 1
1 −1
)√ 1+ρ1+r 0
0
√
1−ρ
1−r
(1 1
1 −1
)
.
This modification ensures that Σˆρ =
(
1 ρ
ρ 1
)
. The response and volumes are also modified accordignly. In
particular the diagonal entries of Ωˆdρ will still be equal (but not necessarily equal to 1).
Note that for C SPD, both C and Cρ are also SPD and therefore are coherent covariance matrices.
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